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ISLAM AND THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF EUROPE 
 
Roger Ballard 
Just where and what is Europe? And what are the consequences of that construction? It 
should come as no surprise that such questions are asked, for even though the assumption that 
Europe is a clearly demarcated geographical space, whose indigenous inhabitants (together 
with their large global diaspora) share a wide range of social, cultural and possibly even 
biological characteristics which mark them off from non-Europeans is a routine — and 
possibly a defining — feature the contemporary world, Europeans are by no means 
exceptional in taking for granted the basic parameters of their conceptual order. Yet just who 
are Europeans? What makes them such? Why are the boundaries of Europe, and hence of 
Europeanness located where they are? In what ways do they differ from non-Europeans? Just 
how and why did this disjunction, whatever its foundations, gain its current salience?  
 Once broached, the importance and significance of these questions is self-apparent. To 
address them we must begin by exploring the issues empirically, in order to establish just 
where the borders of Europe and Europeanness are located, and how they are conceptualised 
by those involved. But this exercise also leads directly on to a second, for if th se borders are 
socially constructed rather than self-evid nt facts of nature — as is invariably the case with 
man-made boundaries — we are also faced with a further set of questions: just why has 
Europe been so constructed, and what are its consequences?  
 
Where and What is Europe? 
 
The physical boundaries of Europe as conventionally understood are relatively easy to identify: 
like millions of other schoolchildren, I learnt from my geography teacher that Europe is the 
landmass lying to the north of e Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the mountains of the 
Caucasus and the Caspian, and although the precise location of the disjunction between 
Europe and Asia was a little uncertain, this could be resolved by drawing a line from the 
Arctic ocean down through the Ural mountains to the Caspian. So that was that: we were now 
in a position to draw lines on the map enabled us to mark out Europe quite unambiguously in 
spatial terms. 
 Yet our conceptualisation of Europe involved much more than an ability to mark off and 
label the northwestern corner of the much larger Afro-Asiatic landmass. In common, I suspect, 
with millions of others, we also took it for granted that the indigenous inhabitants of this area 
(a group to which I and my classfellows manifestly belonged) also shared certain common 
characteristics, and on the basis of which Europeans could therefore be differentiated from 
non-Europeans. But just what were those characteristics? As I recall, our teachers offered us a 
much less specific account of Europe's social as opposed to its spatial identity, but even so our 
lessons, further supplemented by what we learned from films, comics, adventure stories and so 
forth provided us with plentiful material from which to draw our own conclusions. Thus 
despite the very obvious differences between Europe's various national components, we took 
it for granted that all Europeans shared, by definition, a number of common cultural 
characteristics — even if we would have been hard-pressed to specify just what these were. 
We also took if for granted that although North America and Australia might be far removed 
from Europe in spatial terms, those parts of their population which were of European descent 
were “like us”. As such they stood in sharp contrast to the indigenous peoples of these 
colonised territories, and indeed to the indigenous inhabitants of Asia and Africa, whom we 
perceived as standing quite outside — and indeed as being alien to — he European 
civilization to which we ourselves belonged. To be sure we might often have been most 
unclear about the actual content of these differences, but our education and socialisation 
nevertheless generated a mindset which indicated that the disjunction between Europeans and 
non-Europeans was both profound and far reaching.
 Nor was this perception restricted solely to the cultural sphere. European languages such 
as French, German, Russian, Spanish, Italian were those which we might expect to learn as a 
normal part of our education — even if our very English agenda led us to make little more 
than a feeble effort to do so, on the grounds that it was more reasonable to expect for 
“foreigners” to learn English than for us to learn another language. But there were foreigners 
and foreigners. Beyond the immediate arena of at least potentially learnable European 
languages lay a wide variety of much more exotic tongues, such as Arabic, Chinese, Hindi and 
Turkish, and to which only the most serious academic scholars could ever hope to gain 
access.1 
 Over and above all this there is also the question of biological difference — or at least of 
differences in physical appearance. Although I cannot recall being offered an explicitly 
biological explanation of European distinctiveness during the course of my schooling, it is not 
without significance that I and my contemporaries grew up in the post-holocau  era. If for no 
other reason our experience was almost certainly very different from that of our predecessors, 
given that biological  understandings of “race” and racial difference were a routine component 
of the intellectual and educational environment throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century. But even if the post-holocaust generation of Europeans was not formally exposed to 
biological theories of human difference, I am very conscious that it was only when I took an 
undergraduate course in Physical Anthropology that I was explicitly introduced to the 
scientific evidence and arguments with which to demonstrate the falsity of such a perspective.  
 However very few undergraduates attended such courses, then or now. Instead the 
educational system’s preferred approach to the issue was (and is) simply to exclude biological 
theories of “race” from the intellectual agenda. Such a strategy can easily be shown to be 
grossly inadequate, for in the absence of an explicit challenge to popular ideas, expectations 
and perceptions, they can only be expected to persist — and certainly did so in our case. 
Hence even if our formal education offered no explicit support for such perceptions, we 
nevertheless took it for granted that “European” was amongst other things a biological 
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 In Britain “Oriental Languages” are routinely taught only in Oxford, Cambridge, and at the 
specialist School of Oriental and African Studies in London. 
category, such that all Europeans shared a distinctive biological heritage. Once again we 
would have been hard-pressed to identify just what these differences were, except in one 
sphere: skin colour and physical appearance. Europeans, we took it for granted, were “white”, 
such that all non-Europeans could be expected to have a significantly darker skin colour than 
our own.  
 While the arguments above reflect my own experience of primary and grammar schooling 
in southern England in the immediate post-war period, and although perceptions and 
experiences will inevitably vary a good deal by age, class and social context, I suspect that the 
mind-set into which I and my peers were socialised were far from unique. Although local 
variations are bound to exist, I nevertheless suspect that such perceptions and self-
identifications are characteristic not just of an English experience such as my own, but are also 
shared across the length and breadth of Europe. If so it becomes even more important to 
explore how and why such ideas came into existence, why they are so structured, how and 
why they have been perpetuated, and most significantly of all, what purpose their existence 
serves. 
 
The Arbitrary character of the European Construct 
One of the most important obstacles to an exploration of the genesis of taken for granted 
constructs is that the ideas and differentiations in which they are grounded appear to be so 
obvious and inevitable that their arbitrary foundations are comprehensively obscured. Hence at 
the risk of stating the obvious, it is worth setting out the evidence that Europe’s conventional 
boundaries have indeed been arbitrarily constructed — at least in the sense that it would be 
perfectly possible to erect alternative disjunctions by utilising a differing combination of 
linguistic, cultural, geographical and biological criteria. 
 While the identification of the huge promontory lying to the north of the western 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea asa distinctive territorial unit — whether we label it Europe 
or West Asia is immaterial — might seem at first sight to be a sensible act of classificatory 
geography, a moment’s reflection reveals that there is no reason why this physical space 
should of nec ssity be of any great social, political or economic importance. To our 
contemporary imagination the Mediterranean appears to be an obvious setter-apart of diff ring 
worlds, but it was not always so: until a few centuries ago an inland sea offered a relatively 
safe and certainly much speedier means of travel and transportation than did the land, and few 
other civilizations were more united-by-sea than that which grew up around the 
Mediterranean. And while road, rail and air transport may recently have undermined the long-
standing superiority of maritime communication, it is striking that although the straits of 
Gibraltar and the Bosphorous now mark an exceptionally wide conceptual gulf, the straits of 
Dover and Denmark — although physically wider — mark much less significant conceptual 
disjunctions.  
 Why should this be so? Why should the boundaries of what we identify as Europe lie where 
they do and be so strongly marked? One possibility is that the intrinsic biological 
characteristics of the residents of thi  territory are sufficiently distinctive to support this 
disjunction as a fact of nature. Certainly most Europeans assume that this is so, and in crude 
terms one can see why they should hold this belief: on the mean, the indigenous inhabitants of 
the West Asian peninsula have markedly paler skin colouration than that found amongst the 
remainder of the species. Moreover this excessive paleness does have clear biological 
foundations. As a result of generations of selective adaptation the level of melanin found in th  
skins of the indigenous population of the northwesterly corner of the Euro/Afro/Asian 
landmass i significantly lower than the mean for hom  sapiens a  a whole. Moreover this 
genetic deficiency can be relatively straightforwardly explained as an adaptive response to the 
limited UV exposure experienced during generations of residence in a cool, cloudy, and 
relatively northerly territory by a population with a largely vegetarian diet containing low 
levels of vitamin D (Loomis, 1967). Yet although population genetics does at least partially 
affirm the notion of European distinctiveness, what it most emphatically does not confirm is 
the popular assumption that Europeans can be unhesitatingly identified as a clearly demarcated 
population in biological terms. Quite the contrary. Population genetics leads to quite the 
opposite conclusion, for what it reveals is not clear-cut categorical boundaries but rather 
multiple clinal variations in gene frequencies, few of which are congruent with each other. 
Hence even if one of the few distinctive genetic features of Europe’s population arises from 
their local adaptation to UV deficiency, the clinal character of this genetic trait means that it is 
no way restricted to a clearly bounded population. Hence for a human geneticist it comes as 
no surprise that the skin colour differential between populations living on either side of the 
straits of Gibraltar or the Dardanelles is virtually non-existe t. In other words population 
genetics offers no explanation for the conventional location of Europe’s boundaries, or indeed 
for the erection of any other categorical (and hence “racial”) boundaries within the species 
homo sapiens (Cavalli-Sforza, 1995).  
 Yet if the biological basis of European distinctiveness is a myth (albeit as a classic example 
of a charter for an institution in the Malinowskian sense) the claim may well turn out be more 
soundly grounded in social, cultural and linguistic terms, not least because a belief that such 
commonalities do indeed exist is no less central to the myth of Europe than is the claim to a 
common biological heritage. However close examination demonstrates once again that this 
expectation has relatively little substance. Firstly Europe exhibits a high degree of internal 
social, cultural and linguistic variation — as for example, between Scotland and Greece, or 
between Russia and Spain. Secondly when it comes to marking off its boundaries, we 
encounter just the same phenomena as we did with the genetic arguments: despite a strong 
conceptual commitment to the presence of radical cultural disjunctions between Greeks and 
Turks, Spaniards and Moroccans, and Georgians and Azeris, close examination soon reveals 
that the continuities — especially in terms of popular traditions of music, poetry, cuisine and 
dress — across these so-called boundaries are far more extensive than chauvinist defenders of 
deep-rooted difference are normally willing to admit.  
 
Europe, Christianity and Islam 
How, then, is the manifest vigour and stability of the idea of Europe to be explained? My own 
view is that the one possibility that I have overlooked so far — that Europe’s distinctiveness is 
best understood in religious terms, on the grounds that its contemporary boundaries are 
largely congruent with the disjunction between Christia ity and Islam — deserves the closest 
possible examination. Of course some reservations about this definition still need to be borne 
in mind. As current developments in Bosnia remind us, Europe’s wholly indigenous population 
also includes communities with a long-standing commitment to Islam; moreover Europe’s 
population now includes some ten million Muslims whose presence derives from post-war 
labour migration. Likewise it is by no means the case — wh t ver popular European 
imagination may assume — that the territories to its south and east are wholly populated by 
Muslims. Islam may have been politically dominant in the Middle East and North Africa for 
well over a millennium, but Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and above all Egypt2 the loca
population has always contained a small (but often very significant) Christian and Jewish 
presence. Hence apart from these caveats, there seems little doubt that at least in conceptual 
terms, if not so emphatically in empirical terms, the variable most closely congruent with 
Europe’s current spatial  boundary is a religious one: between popular commitment 
Christianity on the one hand, and to Islamic political dominance on the other.  
 This in turn sets the agenda for the remainder of this paper, which is devoted firstly to an 
exploration of the historical emergence of the idea of Europe, and secondly to an examination 
of the way in which the conceptual disjunction between Christendom and its inhabitants and 
their perceived Islamic alter has been developed and utilised over the centuries. I would argue 
that without an awareness of the history of these developments, it is quite impossible to 
understand why the boundaries of Europe and Europeannesss should have been erected at 
their current location, or to appreciate why those boundaries are still defended with such 
vigour, despite the fact that popular commitment to the more spiritual dimensions of the 
Christian tradition is in steep decline almost everywhere.3 
 
The Crusades and the Foundation of the European Enterprise 
 
Although it is undoubtedly the case that the idea of Europe has a long history, the way in 
which it was construed in ancient times shows very little congruence with modern usage;4 and 
since one of the most obvious correlates of Europe’s boundaries as c rrently conceptualised is 
the disjunction between Christendom and Islam, there is good reason to expect that an 
examination of the dynamics of the initial encounter between proto-Europe and its Islamic 
counterpart will provide a particularly useful analytical st rting point. However in so doing I 
should emphasise that this is not to suggest that the Crusaders were therefore engaged in a 
European enterprise in a contemporary sense. Quite the contrary: the Crusaders perceived 
themselves not as Europeans but as warriors for Christ, and as conducting righteous war 
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 Egypt’s Coptic population includes approximately 7 million people. 
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 In a much commented upon article in For ig  Affairs, Huntington (1993) not only predicts 
that “The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations”, but also 
indicates that the most likely location of such a war will be across the fault line between 
Western and Islamic civilizations. 
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 In his analysis of the way in which the second century B.C.E. Book of Jubilees expands on 
Genesis X, Alexander (1982) shows how its author has effectively superimposed a Biblical 
view on earlier Greek understandings of circum-Mediterranean geography to produce the 
now-familiar association between Europe, Asia and Libya (=Africa) and Noah’s three sons 
Japhet, Shem and Ham. However Alexander also shows that the author of Jubilees follows 
Greek precedents in identifying the boundaries of these regions as the river Don, the river Nile 
and the straits of Gibraltar, and that although these divisions subsequently proved to be a very 
fertile source of myth making, their social and political implications at that time were quite 
different from more recent conceptualisations of their significance. 
against the evil followers of a false prophet who had illegitimately occupied the holy land. Yet 
despite the apparently distant agenda of these medieval defenders of Christendom, many 
aspects of the Crusader’s enterprise, and most especially of the conceptual vision in terms of 
which they legitimated their activities, prove to be remarkably congruent with contemporary 
European images, values and assumptions.  
 With this in mind I do not intend to pay any ttention to the social and political tensions 
within the Church, or amongst the feudal aristocracy of the Frankish region where the 
Crusader’s extraordinary military adventures were hatched: such a discussion is way beyond 
the scope of this Chapter. My aim, by contrast, is to explore the id as in terms of which the 
Crusaders justified their adventure, and also the way in which they conceptualised the 
disjunction between the values which they saw themselves as fighting for, as opposed to those 
which they attributed to their enemies — the inhabitants of the territories over which they 
gained  (or at least sought to gain) control. 
 In carrying out this exercise it soon becomes apparent not only that the Crusaders were 
remarkably ill-informed about the values and capabilities of their opponents, but also that in 
some senses this was not at all surprising. It was not just that Islam had become politically 
dominant in much of the territory formerly controlled by the Byzantine and Persian Empires; 
by the tenth century C.E. its population was a great deal more prosperous than the proto-
European territories to the north and west, whose mean level of education, literacy, and 
intellectual awareness was also dramatically lower than in these Islamic lands. Yet if the 
Frankish Crusaders were consequently far less sophisticated than their oriental opponents, 
there is also a strong sense in which their ignorance was quite deliberate. As Daniel (1975) 
demonstrates in devastating detail, the intruders made almost no effort to gai  a p sitive 
understanding of the Islamic world, preferring instead to view their new-found enemies 
through the highly restrictive prisms of their own limited and inevitably self-justifying 
understandings.  
 So just what was the vision of themselves and their opponents which was thus produced? 
From their own pious standpoint, any deviation from established Christian orthodoxy was by 
definition a dangerous heresy; but this was a heresy of the severest possible kind, since it went 
far beyond disputes about the precise relationship of Jesus with the other components of the 
Christian Godhead which then racked the Church. Islam went much further, for this was a 
tradition which denied Jesus’ messianic status (although not his prophethood) in favour of 
what assumed to be an alternative Messiah. In the light of the strong tendency towards 
dualistic thinking embedded within Latin Christianity — and whose roots I shall explore later 
— it is hardly surprising Muslims soon came to be viewed not just as infidels and idolaters, but 
also but as a manifestation of the deep-root d conflict between the forces of goodness and 
evil. It was on this basis that result early medieval Christians convinced themselves that 
Muslims must be followers of the anti-Chris , and that Islam’s central objective was to attempt 
to undermine the project for human redemption which Jesus Christ had set in train.  
 Setting the theological arguments aside for a moment, it is not hard to identify mundane 
reasons why those who joined the Crusades might have found this vision attractive. Over and 
above the opportunity which it offered to the organisers of the Crusades to persuade their 
followers that the pursuit of distant injustices — or what could be so perceived — was of far 
greater importance than finding remedies to more local difficulties, in the eleventh century 
Islam’s very success did indeed seem both perplexing and deeply threatening to many of the 
inhabitants of this poor and peripheral region. With the rise of Islam, almost all the most 
important centres of wealth, power and scholarship in the circum-Mediter anean region were 
incorporated into the new order, and in 732 an Islamic army marched as far north as Poitiers 
before retreating to consolidate its hold over the Iberian peninsula. From the Crusaders’ 
perspective Islam was not just the epitome of threatening otherness, but appeared to be 
successfully swallowing the entire known world: it was therefore an ideal target against which 
to direct unrequited hostility.  
Christendom versus Islam 
Yet just how was this Islamic other conceptualised? Not surprisingly the Prophet Mohammed 
himself was a central focus of attention, most particularly by contrast with Jesus of Nazareth. 
In so doing the Christians would have no truck with the Islamic viewof Jesus (as well as all 
the Jewish prophets) one of a number of prophetic messengers, to which the revelation 
vouchsafed to Mohammed revelation was the final seal. Then as now, very little interest was 
taken in the actual content of Islamic theology, so such so that this possibility was not only 
ignored, but actively resisted. Hence instead of being viewed as a participant in the same 
tradition as Jesus Christ, the Prophet Mohammed (whose name was often deliberately mis-
spelt as Mahound) was routinely perceived as representing its very inverse. Some aspects of 
that inversion have already been noted, such that Mohammed was viewed as the anti-Christ 
and the personification of evil. But the trope went much further: Jesus’ chasteness was 
unfavourably contrasted with Mohammed’s alleged licentiousness, on the grounds that 
Mohammed not only married a multiplicity of wives but had also enjoyed an active sex-life; 
Jesus’ avoidance of violence was also unfavourably compared with Mohammed’s alleged 
passion for war, given Mohammed’s role as an active and indeed successful military leader; 
likewise Jesus’ simplicity, honesty and straightforwardness was unfavourably compared with 
Mohammed’s alleged deviousness and duplicity, on the grounds that the precise details of the 
revelations which the Prophet had received from Allah (and which the Christians in any case 
always dismissed as mere delusions) developed and changed during the course of his career. 
And if Christianity, and indeed Jesus himself, was the epitome of purity, then this rival 
tradition was by definition its inverse — evil and impure. Hence Mohammed was not only 
perceived as a licentious, vicious, violent and duplicitous personification of the evil anti-Chris , 
but also as comprehensively black.5
 How best can we analyze these perceptions? While this construction (as well as its many 
successors) is manifestly profoundly misinformed about the teachings of Islam and its Prophet, 
to put a great deal of analytical effort into demonstrating its untruth is surely to miss the point. 
By contrast an exploration of how and why it is that the users of these images were so 
determined to misguide themselves, and indeed why their successors have continued so to do 
for the best part of a millennium is far more illuminating. Hence I would argue that instead of 
highlighting the mistaken character of these images (deeply and insultingly mistaken though 
they are) they are much better understood as the consequence of boundary construction, and 
most especially one in which those within the boundary have sought to establish and validate 
their own (ideal) characteristics by attributing a wholly inverse set of attributes to the alien 
others who stand outside immediately outside it. In logical terms this amounts to the use of the 
formula {p is what not-p is not}, a procedure which not only serves to underline the arbitrary 
and above all non-essential basis of most processes of boundary construction, but also to 
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 In his much criticised and even more profoundly misunderstood Satanic Verses Salman 
Rushdie made an extremely very well-informed attempt to reinvert these inversions, even if the 
ultimate outcome of his efforts was a complete disaster. 
illuminate the underlying structural logic of Crusader’s vision of the nature of the disjunction
between themselves and their opponents.  
 
 
   Jesus   :  Mahound  
   Christ   : Anti-Christ 
   Chaste   :  Licentious 
   Subject of violence :  Initiator of violence 
   Merciful  :  Vicious  
   Honest   :  Duplicitous 
   Inspired  :  Mad 
   Righteous  : Sinful 
   Pure   :  Impure 
   Light   :  Darkness 
 
If this analysis is sound, it follows that the ascription of such catalogue of inadequacy to Islam 
and its Prophet was of immense convenience to the Crusaders since it allowed them to 
comprehensively differentiate themselves from their opponents whilst also underlining the 
inherent justice of their cause. It also follows that such constructions reveal nothing of value 
about the real character of the alter from which they chose to differentiate themselves, for the 
central function of the attributes in the right hand column is to throw those in the left hand 
column into the clearest possible relief.  
 
The Crusades, Islam and the Construction of Europe 
 
Given their use of such a frame of reference, th  quite outrageous way in which the Crusaders 
behaved towards all those whom they encountered once they had crossed the Bosphorous and 
entered Muslim-controlled territory becomes more explicable — although in no sense more 
justifiable. Within their taken for granted mind set the Crusaders  categorised the entire 
population of the alien territory which they had entered in the same way, regardless of 
religious affiliation. Hence they treated the local Christian and Jewish populations whom they 
encounter d little better than Muslims: all were viewed as equally “other”, such that their very 
presence in the Holy Land was antithetical to the righteous objectives of the defenders of the 
True Cross.6 Justification for the Crusaders’ many bloody outrages was ther fore immediately 
available.  
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 Yet despite their initial success in carving out a precarious toe-hold for h mselves in 
Palestine, the Crusaders were unable to sustain that presence for long. Having captured 
Jerusalem in 1099 C.E., they were expelled from the city by Salah-ad-din in 1187,7 and lost 
control of their last bastion in Acre just over a century later in 1291. Once mobilised, the 
Muslims soon overwhelmed the Frankish incursion. What is most striking, however, is that 
although these trans-Mediterranean adventures gave the intruders first-hand experience of the 
Islamic world, this had remarkably little impact on attitudes and opinions — whether popular 
or scholarly — back home. Hence despite the immense (but still largely unacknowledged) 
impact of Islamic learning on the Latin world, little or no interest was taken in either the 
religion or civilization which had produced it. Instead the vision of Islam as the antithesis of 
Christianity eagerly reinforced, as was the equation between “Saracens”, “Moors” and all 
kinds of oriental others.  
 It was in this sense that the Crusades can usefully be regarded as a mould-setting 
development. In the face of the emergence of an overwhelmingly powerful Islamic order to its 
south and east, a sense of collective id ntity began to crystallise amongst the population of the 
territory which was subsequently to identify itself as Europe — and most especially as western 
Europe. However the banner under which collective mobilisation began to be organised was 
that of Christendom, while the other at whom this nascent power was directed was perceived 
as being Muslim, oriental and black. The foundations around which contemporary 
conceptualisations of Europe were to be constructed were now in place.  
 
The Re-conquest of Spain a d the Logic of the Inquisition  
 
Nevertheless it took some time before the idea of Europe expanded to fill its current 
conceptual space, not least because the greater part of the Iberian peninsula was incorporated 
into the Islamic world in 718 C.E. It was from the security of Al-Andalus that the Ummayad 
Khalifas ruled in great splendour until 1031 C.E., and although Islamic Spain grew steadily 
weaker in military terms under their successors, for several centuries thereafter it remained an 
intellectual and cultural powerhouse. Indeed it was not until 1492 C.E. that the last Muslim 
foothold in Iberia, the kingdom of Granada, finally surrendered to the forces of the Christian 
reconquest. What is worth noting, however, is the sharp contrast in the character of int r-
religious relationships in Christian as opposed to Islamic Spain. 
 While the initial Islamic irruption from North Africa undoubtedly took the form of a 
military conquest, by no means all Spanish Muslims were immigrants from elsewhere. While 
the ancestral origins of many members of the ruling elite may — like the Ummayads 
themselves — have lain elsewhere in the Islamic world, many members of the region’s 
indigenous population were also willing converts to Islam. And if only to counter pernicious 
mythology, it is worth emphasising that it is not the case that Spain’s Muslim rulers sought to 
force their subjects to convert, nor that they put non-converts i  a position of severe social 
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 Stories of battles between Richard the Lion-heart and the violent and heartless Saladin remain 
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and economic disadvantage. Quite the contrary: Islamic Spain contained thriving Jewish and 
Christian populations, and although ultimate political dominance may have been in Muslim 
hands, members of all three traditions treated each other with considerable mutual respect — 
as was generally the case throughout the Islamic world.8  
 However the Christian reconquest which gradually forced its way out of the barren 
highlands of Castile into the more prosperous south brought with it a much more narrow 
minded set of attitudes, based very substantially largely on the proto-European perspective 
which had been developed during the course of the Crusades. As far as the Conquistadors 
were concerned, the Christian tradition allowed no space for pluralistic compromises. Hence 
the reconquest not only entailed a reassertion of political control, but also a comprehensive 
process of re-christianization, since Islam and Judaism were regarded as wholly alien to, and 
indeed as wholly unacceptable within, a Christian context. Spanish Jews and Muslims were 
therefore offered a stark choice: either they could convert,  or must leave on pain of death. 
Despite a considerable amount of emigration, many Jews and Muslims avoided expulsion by 
adopting Christianity, although this by no means brought their troubles to an end. On the 
contrary the “new Christians” — known as Marranos if of Jewish origin, and Moriscos when 
of Muslim descent — remained the objects of intense suspicion.  The slightest of evidence that 
their lifestyles included so-called “un-christian” practices was held strongly against them, 
whilst their hereditary origins was for long afterwards held to throw doubts on the 
genuineness of their religious commitment. 
  Thus despite Christianity’s formal commitment to proselytisation and the prospect of 
conversion, being a Christian was perceived as involving much more than belief and religious 
practice: the precise details of one’s personal lifestyle, and indeed of one’s descent came to be 
regarded as just as important. And it was precisely because of continuing suspicions about the 
reality of the new Christians’ commitment to their adopted faith that the Inquisition took such 
vigorous shape in Spain, since the most important heresies which it’s investigators sought to 
root out were those which might potentially be harboured by the Moriscos and Marranos. 
Hence in sharp contrast to the expectations of Al-A dalus, not only was religious pluralism 
rendered unacceptable, but religious commitment — whether to Christianity, Judaism or Islam 
— came to be seen as a matter of heredity.  
 These developments had some very important consequences for the evolution of the idea of 
Europe. In the first place what we might now describe as process of ethnic cleansing in which 
Jewish and Islamic practice was eliminated from the Iberian peninsula powerfully reinforced 
the expectation (Christian) religious homogeneity was an essential foundation of the social 
order; the extension of this homogeneity right through to the straits of Gibraltar established 
another of contemporary Europe’s boundary markers; and last but not least the inquisition 
further entrenched the view that Judaism and Islam were intrinsically alien to 
Christendom/proto-Europe, full membership of which was also identified as hereditarily 
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 Introducing his analysis of the relationship between medieval Latin Christianity and Islam, 
Daniel (1975, p.23ff) tells the extraordinary story of the ninth century martyrs of Cordoba, 
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determined. Once equipped with this mindset, it also followed that the immense in ellectual 
and architectural achievements Al-Andalus could only be perceived as a Moorish, alien, and 
un-European — and thus of no account. Nor was this just true of Spain: the extent of the 
Islamic contribution to the development of European civilizatio is st ll largely overlooked to 
this day, while the long standing Muslim presence in Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria, Russia and the 
Ukraine was rendered equally invisible. Given Europe’s vision of itself, the prospect that 
Europe might have, or ever have had, and Islamic dimension became such a contradiction in 
terms that it became quite literally unthinkable.9 
 
The legitimation of global Imperialism 
 
Yet if Europe’s vision of itself was initially laid down in pre-modern times, and thus in 
response to the tn prevailing socio-political context, the global economic and political order 
has since been radically transformed, above all by the subsequent process of European 
Imperial expansion. But although our central concerns here are with processes of ideological 
construction rather than of political and economic change, there can be little doubt that this 
pre-modern ideological vision not only served to legitimate the Imperial process, but was itself 
profoundly affected by the enthusiasm with which  it was deployed in these new 
circumstances. 
 Within that wider conspectus, it is worth noting the central role of Spain in the initial 
development of the new global order, symbolised by the spectacular coincidence between the 
fall of Granada, Islam’s last stronghold in Spain, and Christopher Columbus’ departure for the 
“New World” in 1492 C.E.. Since the subsequent global process of discovery, conquest, 
colonisation and exploitation was initiated in the immediate aftermath of the reconquest, it is 
hardly surprising that those involved continued to deploy exactly the same ideological 
framework to legitimise their activities. Hence the new global imperialists not only justified 
their activities in Christian terms — or at least in terms of the expansion of Christendom — 
but also took it for granted that while the idolatrous heathens whom they encountered were 
ripe for conversion, they were also by definition inherently inferior and untrustworthy, and 
could therefore never be their colonizers’ social or political equals. Similarly while the various 
sets of adventurers who sought to gain access to the honey-po  were soon engaged in vicious 
mutual competition, all were nevertheless agreed on one point: however great their mutual 
conflicts, they were all Christians. Hence their mutual differences were as nothing as compared 
to those between themselves and the black barbarians whose territories and persons they 
sought to exploit and overrun.  
 It was on this basis that the trope which I have already outlined was elaborated still further, 
but this time with specific respect to tropical Africa. Unfortunately I have insufficient space to 
explore these developments in detail, other than to suggest that the pattern of oppositions 
which I set out below are already present in Shakespeare’s Tempest, and that they can be 
found in full flower in (for example) Burrough’s novel Tarzan of the Apes, a  well in 
Hollywood’s many screen adaptations of the story.
 
                                         
9 This is precisely the conclusion to which Daniel (1975) is driven in the course of his 
masterful review of the history of ideas in Medieval Europe.  
  European   : African 
  White    : Black 
  Civilization   : Jungle 
  Intellect    : Physical strength 
  Sexual restraint   : Sexual abandonment 
  Reason    : Passion 
  Responsive to law   : Responsive to violence 
  Religion    : Superstition 
  Culture    : Nature 
 
Once entrenched within the European psyche, this conceptual framework began to be globally 
applied, not least because it provided the process of Imperial expansion with ideological 
foundations which were both comprehensive and apparently secure. 
 Imperial expansion not only brought Europeans into contact with a much wider range of 
others than those of which they had previously been aware, but also precipitated a dramatic 
change in the balance of power across that disjunction. In sharp contrast to the experience of 
the Crusaders, the well-armed adventurers who advanced the frontiers of Empire to 
encompass the Americas, tropical Africa and Indonesia encountered opponents who were for 
the most part much weaker than themselves, most especially in military terms.10 Po ical
subordination was so easily imposed that it was widely assumed to be per anent.  
 As a result of these global Imperial adventures the balance of power across the 
Mediterranean also begun to change: Europe and Europeans grew steadily wealthier, while the 
formerly prosperous regions to their south and east entered a period of steady decline,11 so 
much so that they too were eventually subjected to Imperial domination. French colonisation 
in North Africa began in 1834, and by 1848 was sufficiently well-entrench d for Algeria to be 
declared an integral — but of course subordinate — part of France; in 1883 Britain effectively 
took control of Egypt, even if the country was never formally colonised; and when the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed in the aftermath of the first world war, Britain, France and Italy 
encompassed its remnants as their “Protectorates”. Needless to say the ideological vision of 
the intrinsic superiority of all things European reached new heights during this period.  
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 It is striking that in the Indian Ocean and the Far East European adventurers are best 
understood not so much as having established trade routes, but as having eclipsed their 
(largely Muslim) predecessors. And they did so not so much by virtue of greater commercial 
skills, but by enforcing better terms of trade quite literally down the barrels of their cannons.  
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 At least a part of this decline can be traced to the fact that having circumvented theIslamic 
obstacle in a way which had never been open to Venetian merchants, Spanish, Dutch and 
English merchants took over the oriental trade routes which had been a source of much of the 
prosperity of the Islamic heartlands. 
Judaism and the Construction of Europe 
 
Tempting though it might be to run straight on with an examination of the role which 
European visions of its external alters played in this process, we must nevertheless pause for a 
moment to consider the impact of another crucial component in the construction of Europe, 
namely reactions to its principal internalal : Judaism. While Islam rather than Judaism was 
the primary focus of the reconquest and thus the inquisition, the subsequent relative decline in 
the economic and political power of the Islamic world rendered it a much less useful alter 
around which toc nstruct a sense of a collective European identity. Islam was just not 
threatening enough to fill such a role. Yet if Imperial success made European hegemony 
apparently unchallengeable without, a new paranoia emerged with respect to its internal 
integrity: that represented by the perceived threat of a Jewish presence. 
 Although the size of the Jewish population was everywhere relatively small, its members 
heavy concentration in commerce, and especially in banking, gave the community a 
particularly salient public profile. Yet while bankers rarely attract much popular affection — 
most especially amongst those indebted to them — the intensity of the anti-sem tic attitudes 
which erupted in early modern Europe cannot be explained on these grounds alone. After all 
the vast majority of Jews were not financiers. Instead the foundations of anti- emitism were 
similar to (and indeed were initially generated in the same period as) the Crusaders’ anti-
Islamism. Jews, like Muslims, perceived as embodying the antithesis of Christian values; and if 
anti-Islamism was largely organised around a critique of the Prophet Mohammed, anti-Jewish 
hostility also had theological groundings, although in this case focusing primarily on the Jews’ 
alleged responsibility for the crucifixion. Despite the privilege of their direct exposure to 
Jesus’ teaching, the Jews were perceived as having deliberately and perversely rejected 
Christ’s message, and indeed to have killed him — an act for which they must and should be 
held eternally to blame.  
 Once again popular understandings of Jews and Jewishness were in no way grounded in an 
awareness of the actual content of Jewish belief and behaviour. Just as with the Muslims — 
although with even less excuse given their immediate spatial proximity, as well as the biblical 
foundations of Jewish law and practices — Christian commentators remained (and were once 
again determined to remain) profoundly ignorant about such matters. Instead they preferred to 
assume that their Jewish neighbours’ lifestyles and religious practices must by definition be the 
inverse of their own. 
 Hence if Christians lived by honest toil, Jews were perceived as making a living through 
gratuitous, mean-minded and exploitative financial manipulation; and if upright Christians 
worshipped the one true God, Jews were not only perceived as having perversely rejected the 
revelation which they had been privileged enough to witness, but also as organising their 
worship around rituals which were an even more perverse simulacrum of Christian practice.  
Hence it was widely believed that in the secrecy of their own tight-knit and clannish 
communities Jews celebrated a devilish version of the Eucharist, where they deliberately 
consumed the blood of specially sacrificed Christian infants. Using the same analytical 
approach as that which we deployed earlier, the following patterns can be seen to emerge in a 
Jewish/Christian context: 
 
   Christians  :  Jews 
   Workers  :  Usurers 
   Honest   :  Dishonest bloodsuckers 
   Generous  :  Mean 
   Open   :  Closed and clannish 
   Straightforward :  Devious 
   Human   :  Inhuman 
   Inspired by God :  Inspired by the devil 
   Pure    :  Polluted 
 
As before, these oppositions tell us nothing of any reliability about Judaism, for the Jews’ 
alleged characteristics were constructed once again as the inverse of the qualities which their 
Christian excluders believed to be characteristic of themselves.  
 
Aryanism, Anti-semitism, and the articulation of German nationalism 
 
Although elaborated in a particularly dramatic way during the course of the Reformation,12 
these ideological constructions were by no means confined to the religious sphere, as became 
dramatically apparent in the context of the explosive growth of German nationalism during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. As the German-speaking peoples of central Europe grew 
acutely conscious of their condition of political disunity, particularly in comparison to their 
great rivals, the French, the elaboration of an ideology of German-ness around which to 
construct a new sense of national unity became an urgent priority. This task was far from 
straightforward, however, not least because the Germans were well aware that their rivals to 
the west had long dismissed them as backward and uncivilised. How, then, could they 
construct a vision of themselves as a civilised people when the normal means of doing so — 
through an assertion of roots in an ancient Roman heritage — was bound to confirm the 
higher status of the French, whose Latin connections were manifestly much closer than their 
own?  
 It was in this context that the discovery of the remarkably close correspondence between 
the grammatical and lexical structure of Sanskrit and a number of European languages — and 
most particularly (or so it was believed) with German — came as a godsend. As Poliakov 
(1974) shows, this at long last provided German nationalists with a means of confirming that 
their civilization had ancient roots, not so much in what they could now dismiss as degenerate 
Rome, but rather in the even mor  ancient (and therefore more “classical”) traditions of Indo-
European civilization. While this had the disadvantage (as some might see it) of offering at 
least one group of non-Europeans ideological equality with Europeans, this was of little 
concern to the Germans: unlike the French, the Portuguese and above all the British they had 
no imperial presence in India. Moreover the great advantage of the theory of Aryanism from a 
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 Martin Luther and his associates were responsible for articulating, and thus legitimating some 
particularly vicious forms of anti-Jewish rhetoric (Webster 1990) 
German nationalist perspective was that it allowed them to construct a claim to distinctiveness 
which not only marginalised the French, but also enabled them to to exclude their eastern 
rivals the Slavs even more firmly on the grounds that their heritage was non-Aryan. Hence 
nineteenth century German romanticism enjoyed immense success as it constructed a new and 
highly influential myth about the allegedly Aryan roots of European civilization in general, of 
the Germans in particular.  
 Yet however vacuous these Aryan fantasies may have been, they were far from harmless, 
not least because the occupants of the territory which nationalist sentiment now claimed as its 
natural heritage was far from homogeneous. While the Slavs were the most numerous of the 
allegedly alien non-Aryan groups resident in this territory, at an ideological level a much 
smaller group was perceived as offering a far greater threat to national integrity: that long-
standing target of Christian chauvinism, the Jews. Hence the Jews’ symbolic role as a 
convenient alter around which Germany — and beyond that Europe — might construct a 
sense of its religious and social integrity was powerfully reinforced.  
 Nor was that all. Not only did Aryan theory further legitimate hereditarian explanations of 
all aspects of social, cultural and religious distinctiveness, whilst also suggesting that any 
admixture of alien blood was necessarily a threat to the integrity of the superior Aryan 
zeitgeist,  but this outlook was seen as being readily compatible with one of the most 
significant (and certainly one of the most intellectually influentia ) developments in nineteenth 
century science — Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection. And while Darwin himself 
was a great deal more careful than the enthusiastic “Darwinism” which his discoveries 
inspired, the hereditarian, hierarchichal and essentialist perspective espoused his followers was 
soon the intellectual rage accross the length and breadth of Europe. As a result thinkers within 
a wide range of disciplines began to put an immense amount of effort into showing how all 
forms of human differentiation, whether social, cultural, religious or biological, within such an 
evolutionary schema. Of course virtually all of this “science” has since been comprehensively 
discredited, but this did not occur before an immense amount of damage had been done. By 
the end of the nineteenth century the process of racialisation (Miles 1989) was in full swing, 
such that ethnic and national disjunctions of all kinds were routinely represented as being 
biologically grounded.  
 This had far-reaching implications. Firstly the arbitrary character of all such disjunctions 
was comprehensively obscured by the assumption that they were naturally grounded, and 
therefore inevitable; secondly given the taken for granted assumptions of social Darwinism, it 
followed that all social, cultural and religious practices of all kinds could be arranged across a 
hierarchical spectrum from the more fit to the less; thirdly these ideas were immediately used 
not only to suggest that the social disjunctions to which these gave rise were biologically 
innate, but also to legitimize all forms of social inequality across them. It seemed so simple. 
Surely it was only right and proper that the more fit and more advanced should hold sway over 
those whose primitive characteristics rendered them less fi , less advanced and therefore less 
civilized?  
 Having penetrated virtually all areas of nineteenth century thought, such assumptions were 
swiftly applied in every conceivable context. It is not hard to see why. On the one hand they 
offerred a ready means of legitimising the dramatically widening inequalities between 
metropolitan Europe and the global sweep of its Imperial possessions, and on the other of 
explaining away Europe’s many internal inequalities, whether of class, ethnicity or religion. All 
could now be seen as equally “natural”. No-where was this tendency more salient, or more 
significant, than with respect to Europe’s Jewish population. Scientific racism powerfully 
reinforced the long-standing view that Judaism was the antithesis of Christianity, for he Jews’ 
semitic heritage was now confirmed not only as being different from and inferior to that of 
Europeans, but also as a threat to their biologicalintegrity, and especially to the purity and 
vitality of their unique Aryan heritage.  
 As Poliakov (1982) demonstates in his masterly overview, these ideas — alb it in various 
local guises — found a ready reception in all parts of Europe. Yet against this background 
Germany nevertheless emerges as a special case, since German nationalist’s long-st nding use 
of Jews and Jewishness as its central alte meant that nowhere was this mode of thinking 
embraced more enthusiastically than in Germany. One hardly needs to emphasise its horrific 
consequences: in an effort to cull out the biologically backward elements from the population, 
whether they were physically or mentally handicapped, Gypsies or Jews, six million souls were 
herded into gas chambers.  
 Indeed so outrageous was this episode in European history that once highlighted by the 
victors of 1945, it wholly transformed the way in which ethnic differentiation would be 
conceptualised, at least for the imediate future: since then the overt biologisation of ethnic 
difference has been wholly discredited, at least in polite circles, and “race” has therefore had to 
be placed between inverted commas. Yet before moving on to explore the subsequent 
developments, two points are worth making. Firstly that even though the holocaust was the 
ultimate apotheosis of the Aryan (and in a narrow sense German) fantasy, it must ot be 
forgotten that the remainder of Europe’s population offerred little serious resistance to this 
process of ethnic cleansing — and thereby implicitly acquiesced in it.13 Secondly, and 
consequently, the ideas which underpinned the holocaust cann t be seen as unique to 
Germany; they had become (and in all probability still remain) a pan-European phenomenon. 
 
Europe and Islam in the late twentieth century 
 
Although it would be idle to suggest that anti-semitic attitudes, or indeed more general 
support for theories of biological racism, have been entirely eclipsed in the aftermath of the 
holocaust, it is indisputable that the public expression of such views did become profoundly 
unfashionable, such that they now play a much more attenuated role in the construction of 
Europe than they did half a century ago. Instead other means — and most especially a 
renewed emphasis on culture rather biology as an essential source of difference, and above all 
though a resurgence of anti-Islamic paranoia — have been used to achieve just the same ends. 
So it is that as we approach the millennium long-dorma t ideas about and attitudes about the 
“Islamic threat” have sprung suddenly back into fashion, to provide a powerful new dynamic 
in the way in which Europe makes sens  of itself. To appreciate the logic of this development 
we must briefly consider the radical shifts which have taken place in the pattern of political and 
economic relations between Europe and the Islamic lands to its south and east during the 
course of past half century.  
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 It seems most unlikely that the inhabitants of territories not subjected to German occupation 
would have behaved very differently from those that were. While most of Britain was not put 
to the test, the Jewish population w s removed from the only part of its territory which was so 
occupied — the Channel Islands. 
 Firstly Europe’s previously minuscule Muslim population has increased dramatically in size, 
largely as a result of the arrival of long-dista ce labour migrants in the midst of the post-war 
industrial boom. Although the migrants’ national origins were extremely diverse, and by no 
means all were Muslim, the scale of Europe’s Islamic population increased dramatically. It is 
now at least ten million strong, and rising fast. Secondly the steep rise in the price of oil during 
the nineteen seventies and eighties not only emphasised the extent to which Europe had come 
to rely on the Muslim world as a source of energy, but also highlighted the scale of the 
consequent outflow of wealth, even if the benefits of this new-f und affluence was in fact 
largely confined to tiny ruling elites in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates and (although slightly 
less dramatically) the Maghreb. Thirdly since rapid economic growth in Europe has been 
accompanied by continued stagnation in the Arab world (for very little of th  new wealth 
trickled down to the broad mass of the population), the disparity of living standards to the 
north and south of the Mediterranean has widened still further. Nevertheless numerous 
bridgeheads across this divide are now in place as a result of m ss migration during the sixties 
and seventies, and although fortress Europe is now committed to bringing that inflow to a halt, 
it still continues almost inexorably. Economic inequality across the Mediterranean has steadily 
increased the pressure to migrate, and even though new arrivals from the Islamic world are 
only too aware of the intense hostility they can expect to encounter, moving north offers at 
least a chance of prosperity, however remote. Staying put seems to offer nothing but a dead 
end.  
 Last but not least, the collapse of the Soviet Union has produced a seismic shift whose 
aftershocks are still with us. Firstly Europe’s eastern boundaries are beginning to crystallise 
more clearly than ever before. Ever more salient conflicts are now erupting betw en the 
Russians and their allies such as the Ukrainians, the Georgians and the Serbs on the one hand, 
and assorted Muslim groups such as the Turks, Chechens, Azeris, Uzbegs, Tajiks, and 
Khazakhs on the other; a fault-line is once again emerging at the boundaries of Christendom. 
A second consequence of the demise of the Soviet Union is that the internal division between 
Eastern and Western Europe which once generated such obsessive concern has now largely 
disappeared, and with it the utility of “militant Communism” — or indeed its predecessor, 
“The Zionist conspiracy” as a focus for  paranoid concern. Instead Islam has been brought 
back from abeyance to fill once again its former symbolic role as the antithesis of European 
civilization and all it stands for. 
 Yet despite the many structural parallels between the contemporary situation and that 
which emerged a millennium ago, there is one crucial difference between the two. In the 
original scenario it was Christendom which stood in a position of political and economic 
disadvantage, but in the contemporary context those roles have been comprehensively 
reversed. But if Europe’s contemporary inhabitants consequently stand in sharp contrast to 
their tenth century predecessors, since they have no immediate need to fear the either the 
military power or the economic wealth of their Islamic neighbours, the contradictions across 
this disjunction have by no means been eliminated. If Europeans now feel threatened by their 
Muslim neighbours — as indeed they do — it is for precise the opposite reasons. The more 
Muslims seek to reduce current  inequalities, the more they are bound to challenge the position 
of economic and political privilege which Europeans currently enjoy.
 Not only are such challenges already being mounted both internally and externally, but they 
are also beginning to be articulated in ideological as well as material terms; not surprisingly, 
defensive responses to these challenges have now begun to be devised. While the 
reinforcement of Fortress Europe through the introduction of ever more draconian 
immigration controls is one such response, another is the ever-increasing tendency to 
demonise the ten million or more Muslims who are now resident within, most particularly 
when they make an effort to articulate  their own material, religious and cultural and cultural 
concerns. For although Europe’s Muslims are anything but a homogeneous group, they all 
have certain common interests. All are worried about the level of exclusion and discrimination 
they encounter, and wish to challenge it;  and although their understandings of what Islam 
consists of are extremely varied, all incorporate some kind of commitment to an Islamic 
agenda in their personal lives, and hence, for example, would wish to see that agenda treated 
with greater sympathy by the local educational system. 
 What is striking, however, is the intensity of the hostility which very presence of a Muslim 
population, let alone the articulation of the mildest of such Islamic demands is currently 
precipitating in virtually every corner of Europe where they have settled, so much so that there 
is good reason to suggest that the visions of difference originally erected a thousand years ago 
are now being both revived and revised.  
 While an explicit attempt to illory Muslims as followers of the anti-Chris  could not be 
expected to make much impact in a contemporary context, a careful examination of the 
pattern of structural oppositions set out on page 10 in the light of current obsessions reveals 
some disturbing parallels. On the face of it “licentiousness” might now seem to be a quite 
meaningless charge — until one remembers that the super-sensuous harem remains an image 
of considerable force, while a favourite criticism of Islamic lifestyles is that its gender 
conventions are innately oppressive, and allegedly sanction a comprehensive degradation of 
women. However the view that Islam necessarily renders Muslims violent, vicious, duplicitous 
and mad chimes more directly with contemporary views, and is supplemented with an even 
more popular image of Muslims as over-committed fanatics, or in other words as 
“fundamentalists”. Not only have the terms “Muslim” and “fundamentalist” become virtually 
synonymous, particularly in the popular press, but any such commitments are  perceived as 
being far more than a merely religious phenomenon.  Muslims are therefore routinely 
presumed to have an authoritarian and anti-democratic in outlook, to be hostile to any kind of 
joy or gaiety, and to be such blind followers of convention as to be outside the bounds of 
rational thought and reflection. While the accusation of impurity has now largely lapsed —
even if they are still routinely perceived as dirty and/or smelly — the vision of Muslims as 
black appears both to have been redefined and given a new vitality. Moors may no longer be 
assumed to be as coal-black as Shakespeare’s Othello, but skin colour remains a crucial 
differentiator: the feature which is held ultimately to differentiate Europe’s non-indigenou
population (and of which Europe’s Muslim neighbours are the most immediate exemplars) is 
their nominal possession of a significantly darker natural skin colour.  
 Bearing all this in mind we can now construct a revised set of oppositions which builds 
upon those originally erect d by the crusaders:  
 
   European  :  Muslim 
   Gender-equal  :  Gender-oppressive 
   Democratic  :  Authoritarian 
   Progressive  :  Backward-looking 
   Modern  :  Traditional 
   Liberal   :   Fundamentalist  
   Governed by reason :  Fanatical 
   Joyful    :  Kill-joys 
   Civilized  :  Uncivilized 
   White   :  Not-white 
 
If this analysis holds, it follows that the Islamic world has now been restored to its former 
position as Europe’s primary alter, and that in this process Islam has once again been 
represented as the antithesis of just those characteristics which Europe and Europeans would 
like to believe that they themselves epitomise.  
 
Contingency and Specificity in the Construction of Europe 
 
Yet although this approach serves powerfully to illuminates just why it is that the boundaries 
of Europe (both external and internal) should be located where they are, as well why they are 
defended with such passion, it also opens up a yet more fundamental question still. Is Europe’s 
contemporary vision of itself, and most especially the means by which it constructs it 
boundaries, simply the product of a long series of historical contingencies, or is it an intrinsic 
— and hence distinctive — f ature of European culture itself? 
 That the developments highlighted here are the product of a wide range of historical 
contingencies self-evident, as is the prospect that Europe’s future definition of itself will 
develop in response to future, and hence quite unpredictable, contingencies. To suggest 
otherwise would be to adopt a position of manifestly indefensible essentialism. In the same 
vein the use of antithesis in the processes of boundary construction is far from being unique to 
Europe, as the recent eruption of near-genocidal ethnic polarisation in contexts as widely 
separated as Biafra, Rwanda, the Lebanon, Punjab, Sri Lanka and East Timor makes only too 
clear. Moreover numerous ethnographic reports demonstrates that the tendency to envisage 
distant neighbours as occupying an inverted world in which anti-humans walk on their heads 
and insert food directly into their stomachs, where rivers flow up-hill and the seasons are 
chaotic is an equally global phenomenon.14  
 Yet despite all these reservations and contra-indications, I would nevertheless suggest that 
while exposure to social, cultural and religious pluralism has for long been a normal part of 
human experience — if only because very few societies are so small, so homogenous and so 
isolated as to lack any such internal diversity — the cultural tradition of Western Europe is 
such that for many centuries its inhabitants have found this experience exceedingly difficult to 
cope with; and although such difficulties may now be a global phenomenon, it is also worth 
emphasising that in every one of the extra-Europe n contexts listed in the previous paragraph 
(and it would be easy to construct a much longer list) the current condition of apparently 
unbridgeable polarisation is very much a odern development. Of course this stands in sharp 
contrast to the widespread assumption that such conflicts are nothing more than eruption of 
ancient tribal hatreds, an expectation which is itself grounded in the long standing European 
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 Middleton’s account of Lugbara Religion (1960) offers a classic account of such a vision. 
view that all its colonial possessions were riddled with barely suppressed tribal and religious 
rivalries, and that in the absence of firm Imperial guidance even the slightest disturbance could 
easily precipitated bloody civil war.  
 Such constructions were, of course, an exceedingly effective means of legitimating policies 
of divide and rule, let alone the whole Imperial exercise — as well as being yet another 
example of the process of antithetical thought which I have sought to highlight here. But while 
it is obviously quite inappropriate to expect that we can extract ourselves from these mistakes 
though a romantic inversion of the conventional polarities, there is nevertheless a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that in historical terms inter- thnic and inter-r ligious relations have  — or 
at least have until very recently — broadly cordial, in sharp contrast to Western Europe, 
where the history of religiously inspired genocidal war is both exceptionally long and 
exceedingly bloody. This suggests a further set of questions. Why did Europeans and proto-
Europeans exhibit such an early as well as such a vigorous commitment t  the construction of 
non-negotiable antithetical boundaries? And although others may have subsequently been 
infected by this mode of thought, largely as a result of the global success of the Imperial 
project, could there still be something specifically European about this habit of thinking? If so, 
where and in what contexts might its roots best be identified? 
 
The Augustinian roots of hostility to pluralism in Catholic Christianity   
 
Although the arguments advanced here have ranged widely through time and space, one 
common theme nevertheless emerges from them: all are located close to, and are very often at 
the core of, Europe’s religious development. This suggests that a careful exploration of 
Christian theology, and especially its western and Lati  forms, might well prove helpful. At 
first sight this focus might seem surprising, on the grounds that the teachings of Jesus of 
Nazareth are an unlikely source of such violent and inhuman attitudes: indeed given Jesus’ 
powerfully articulated commitment o openness, tolerance and justice, quite the opposite 
outcomes might have been expected. However I would suggest that it is not so much on the 
teachings of the founder himself which are at issue here, but rather on those of a key figure in 
the development of Western Christianity: Saint Augustine, the fourth century bishop of Hippo. 
 In focusing on Augustine I certainly would not wish to suggest that all the theological 
arguments with which he is associated were entirely his own creation, for they manifestly grew 
out of his close association with figures such as Ambrose and Jerome. However from our 
perspective the significance of his teachings arises firstly from the fact that he formalised his 
position just as the split between the Catholic and Byzantine traditio s was taking place, and 
secondly because theologians in the Western churches — both Catholic and Protestant — 
have been referring back to his teachings ever since.
 In cosmological terms — for it is Europe’s vision of its place within the social universe that 
is our central concern here — one of the most striking aspects of Augustine’s theological 
perspective is the extent to which his youthful commitment to Manicheism continued to 
influence his thinking. Of course Augustine subsequently went out of his way o distance 
himself from that tradition, but many aspects of his theological vision, which saw light as 
pitted against darkness, reason against passion, spirit against matter, and truth against wholly 
misguided heresy, was profoundly dualistic in character. To be sure Augustine differed from 
the Manicheans on certain crucial issues, not least in his rejection of their radical asceticism, 
and his contrary insistence that God’s grace, mediated through Christ and the Church, could 
nevertheless provide A am’s intrinsically sinful offspring with a route to redemption and thus 
salvation. As a result his most influential doctrinal development of all — th  n tion of original 
sin — became the very core of Catholic theology, so as it were Christianising the Manicheans 
comprehensively negative evaluation of the existent world.  
 Although a full exploration of Augustine’s theology far beyond the scope of this brief 
essay, the very dualism of his thinking makes it relatively easy to use the analytical approach 
deployed earlier in order to delineate the broad outline of his conceptual vision: 
 
   Light   : Darkness 
   God   : Satan 
   Good   : Evil 
   Catholic  : Heretic 
   Christian  : Pagan 
   Salvation  : Damnation 
   Spirit   : Matter 
   Mind   : Body 
   Reason  : Passion 
   Celibacy  : Sexuality 
   Civilization  : Barbarism 
   Culture  : Nature 
 
Augustine’s powerful influence over many generations of thinkers in the Latin tradition, both 
Catholic and Protestant, is universally acknowledged, as is the impact of his theological vision 
on the development of European religious and cultural ideology. But what is also quite 
astonishing in this context is the closeness of the congruence between Augustine’s 
cosmological vision and those which we have extracted from subs quent contexts. To be sure 
the others in opposition to which these subsequent structures were erected were quite 
different from the Manicheans, Donatists and Pelagians against whom the bishop of Hippo 
directed his scathing rhetoric. With the exception of the Jews, those later targets were either 
of little concern to Augustine, as with the inhabitants of tropical Africa, or had not yet come 
into existence, as with Islam. But what is most striking is that every single component in the 
patterns of structural opposition identified earlier has a parallel in one aspect or another of the 
pattern set out above.15 
 Nor is this tendency to construct outsiders as evil, alien and comprehensively despicable 
restricted to formal theology, or even to what has now become a relatively narrow sphere of 
Christian commitment. On the contrary this mode of thinking is equally deeply entrenched at 
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 Further parallels can also be found elsewhere. Although concerned primarily with issues of 
gender, Plumwood (1993: 43) presents a very similar pattern of oppositions which she also 
suggests are “key elements in the dualistic structure of western thought”. 
the very heart of European culture, and at all possible levels. Apart from the Tarzan myth 
mentioned earlier, just three illustrative examples of the extent of its influence will have to 
suffice here. First in Shakespeare, three of whose most significant plays, Othello, The Tempest 
and The Merchant of Venice focus primarily — albeit from a critical perspective — on myths 
of otherness about M slims, Black Africans and Jews; secondly the Rushdie affair, which gave 
rise to the most astonishing amount of vituperation against the Islamic tradition as a whole, 
and which was most vigorously articulated not by the Churches but by secular radicals.16 And 
finally contemporary France, where the concept of lai ité is currently being used to challenge 
the legitimacy of any kind of public commitment to Islam amongst its Muslim minorities, so 
much so that attempts by schoolgirls adopt the hijab are construed as constituting a wholly 
unacceptable challenge to the integrity of the Republic.  
 Moroever of the various latent lt rs available to Europe, there can be little doubt that it is 
Muslims and Islam which currently generate by far the highest level of paranoia. Hence whilst 
that part of Europe’s population which is of non-European descent also includes many non-
Muslims, and even in Britain where the non-Muslims form a clear majority within the visible 
minorities, popular hostility is at present overwhelmingly directed at the Muslim presence. 
 
Europe in Comparative Perspective 
 
In order to throw the apparent normality of all this into some kind of perspective, it is highly 
instructive to consider how those traditions which did not root themselves in Augustine’s 
tortured and often near-paranoid dualism responded to encounters with religious and ethnic 
difference; nor do we even need to look beyond Christianity itself to engage in such an 
exercise, since the Orthodox traditions of the Eastern Church offers an ideal test-bed for 
comparison. Firstly at an empirical level, its followers normally appear to have been far less 
perplexed by religious difference than their Western counterparts: hence though physically far 
closer to Jerusalem, they never perceived it as having been “lost” in the sense which seemed 
self-evident to the Crusaders. This difference in perception, which was also repeated in 
numerous other contexts, has very clear theological roots. Thus while the Orthodox tradition 
certainly accepted the notion f the Fall, this was not — pace Augustine — construed as 
giving rise to an inescapable condition of original sin, nor was material and physical existence 
perceived as inherently evil. Quite the contrary: Orthodox cosmology views the created 
universe as a manifestation of the divine essence, and hence it is a vehicle through which a 
realisation of God’s majesty can be achieved, rather than an obstacle to salvation. And because 
such a realisation can take place directly, rather than requiring the necessary mediation of 
Christ and the Church to remove original sin, Orthodox cosmology is prepared to accept that 
even the unbaptised may still gain salvation; hence it provided conceptual space within which 
alternative spiritual traditions — i cluding those which owed nothing to Christianity — might 
still be recognised as at least partially legitimate. Hence I would argue that it is precisely 
because they were not constrained by the dualistic absolutism of an Augustinian heritage that 
Orthodox responses to religious and cultural diversity have (at least until very recently) 
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Fay Weldon’s pamphlet, Sacred Cows (1989). The issues are more fully discussed in Akhtar 
(1989) and Kabbani (1989) 
displayed so few parallels with Western developments, such that those inspired by Eastern 
Christianity have normally found it far easier to cope with conditions of pluralism than have 
their Protestant or Catholic counterparts.  
 In this respect one of the most distinctive features of the western European cultural 
tradition is the depth of its tendency towards dualistic thinking, accompanied by an equally 
strong tendency to evaluate the physical (as opposed to the moral and spiritual) world in 
negative terms.  But although these ideas can be traced back to Augustine’s manichean 
heritage, it worth emphasising that dualism by no means necessarily leads to these conclusions: 
in its classic Zoroastrian form, physical existence is regarded as intrinsically good, even if 
under constant attack from hostile forces of darkness and decay. And if we look still further 
afield, we find that Hindu tradition (together with virtually all of its Buddhist variants) also 
takes a similarly positive view, albeit by a different route and in the context of a radically 
different cosmological vision. Thus while most parts of the Indic tradition posit a cyclical (as 
opposed to a linear or dualistic) cosmology, such that the existent world of samsara is 
routinely perceived as impermanent and therefore illusory,  it is also by definition a 
manifestation of the otherwise unqualified Ultimate. Nor does either tradition appear to have 
had any great difficulty in coping with pluralism, for variety was viewed as necessarily intrinsic 
to positively evaluated existence.  
 What, though, about that bête noir of the Western world, Islam? While popular opinion 
may hold that Islam is intrinsically hostile to all non-Mus ims, the Qur’an itself includes a clear 
injunction that the “peoples of the book” should be treated with respect, even if orientalist 
scholarship has put a great deal of effort into seeking to demonstrate otherwise. Yet although 
certain aspects of the Shari’a (as well as recent politi al developments) may seem to support 
such a conclusion, it would be quite wrong to suggest that such an outlook is a necessary 
characteristic of Islamic practice. To take one immensely influential example, the sufi 
philosopher Ibn Al- rabi (1165-1240 C.E.) developed the doctrine of  wahadat al-wujud (the 
unity of being) to argue that because everything that exists is God, or to be more precise a 
manifestation of the otherwise transcendent divine essence, and since there can be no 
exceptions to this truth, it follows that even those religions which stand right outside the 
inheritance of Abraham and Moses are nevertheless components of the divine theophany. 
Hence no matter how far the practices of those who follow such alternative traditions may 
diverge from conventional Islamic expectations, all both manifest and reflect an awareness of 
the One, and must therefore be respected.17 
 Once set in this kind of comparative context, the far reaching consequences of Augustinian 
theology on Western Europe’s vision of itself, and most especially on the way in which 
transactions with others might be handled can be brought more clearly into focus. Whilst most 
other civilizations found it quite unneccessary to demonise otherness, the negative dualism 
which lies at the heart of Western Europe’s religious and cultural heritage led to a different, 
and indeed a very distinctive, conclusion. In Augustine’s theology there is only one path to 
salvation, which can in turn only be followed by an elite which seeks self- on ciously to 
distance itself from the fallen world — r to put it another way, if there is but one route to 
Civilisation in the face of an otherwise violent, squalid and impassioned state of nature; and 
while the elect may well be sorely tempted to indulge in that which they so determinedly deny 
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themselves — as indeed was Augustine himself — the line must be held: those deviate 
(whether by accident, design or sheer ignorance is immaterial) necessarily threaten everything 
that is good and true.  
 While it would be quite absurd to blame Augustine for the way in which his theological 
outlook was subsequently developed, there is nevertheless good reason to suggest that it is 
within this mould — albeit mediated by a host of historical contingencies — that his 
intellectual heirs have continued to construe human otherness. But to complete the argument, 
one last caveat must still be dealt with: the plain fact that in the contemporary world such 
modes of thought, which so easily lead both to religious polarisation and to genocidal ethnic 
cleansing are by no means an exclusively Western European phenomenon. Does this destroy 
my argument? I think not.  
 Firstly wherever such polarisation has erupted in non-European contexts, this has 
invariably been against he trend of long-standing local moral and cultural expectations, rather 
than in congruence with them; secondly virtually all such eruptions — whether we focus on 
the rabid anti-Islamism of a Slobodan Miloševi  in Serbia or the Vishva Hindu Parishad in 
India, or indeed the equally rabid anti-Western and anti-Christian rhetoric of groups such as 
the Jamaat-i-Islam or the F.I.S. — are best understood as responses to the same historical 
contingency: a bruising encounter with the political, economic and ideological impact of 
Imperialism. It is precisely because of the success of that process that the impact of 
Augustine’s intellectual heritage has now gone global.18 Yet if “fundamentalist Islam” has 
consequently emerged as Europe’s collective nightmare, there is a powerful sense in which 
Europeans have only themselves to blame for their predicament. If Islamic activists now find it 
strategically advantageous to pay back those who have for so long disparaged, excluded, 
exploited and oppressed them back in their own money, no-one should be surprised. Europe is 
receiving no more than its just desserts.19  
 
Conclusion 
 
Nevertheless we still face a pressing question: how might the intensifying process of 
polarisation in which we are currently enmeshed best be unwound? If my analysis is sound, a 
number of much recommended solutions can only be dismissed out of hand. Firstly any 
attempt to resolve the problem by further excluding Muslims — whether by reinforcing the 
walls of Fortress Europe, by introducing repatriation programs, or by denying Europea  
Muslims the right to build their own lives on their own terms — is doomed to failure, since 
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 While this strategy certainly proved a very effective means of causing external alarm and 
confusion, it is still a much more open question as to whether the adoption of some of the 
West’s worst traits — albeit dressed up in Islamic clothes — is having anything like as positive 
an impact on the internal structure Muslim societies.  
such policies actually constitute an open invitation to minority communities to close ranks to 
reinforce their distinctiveness, the better to defend their interes s. No matter how alien such 
developments may see, Muslims and Muslim communities are an integral part of Europe’s 
social order.  
 Yet as just what sort of Muslims? This gives rise to a second line of argument: that if only 
European Muslims would adopt less alien, less aggressive (and indeed less “fundamentalist”) 
modes of behaviour, they would encounter much less hostility and much greater acceptance — 
or so it is often suggested. Yet although the Islamic tradition as a whole is much less 
aggressive, much more easy going and above all far more intellectually sophisticated than most 
Europeans have ever been able to acknowledge, the suggestion that Muslims can earn greater 
respect by acting in a less challenging way is not only grossly historically mis-informed, but 
wholly misses the point. Current Muslim aggressiveness (of which only the first stirrings have 
yet begun) is by no means an innate feature of the Islamic tradition: rather it is best understood 
as a strategic vehicle which is currently being deployed as a means of challenging exclusion 
and devaluation. Since this strategy has caused so much alarm and confusion amongst their 
excluders, the prospect of it being abandoned is remote. 
 As meaningful options have shrunk, so a third — and apparently much more reasonable — 
strategy has come to the fore: the suggestion that Europeans should make a much greater 
effort to inform themselves about Islam. Yet although such a commitment can only be 
regarded as welcome, even if it were implemented there is still good reason to suggest that the 
availability of more accurate information about Islam would have any significant impact in its 
own right on current attitudes.  After all Europe has had the Islamic world as its neighbour for 
more than a millennium, but as Daniel (1975) shows, it has never felt able either to 
acknowledge its alter as an equal, or to take its cultural or religious traditions seriously. 
Having spent more than a millennium reading Islam through the distorting prism of their own 
deeply entrenched assumptions, more information, however accurate, is unlikely to make 
much difference to conventional European judgements.  
 Is there any solution? I believe there is, although by a route that is so deeply uncomfortable 
that the very need to embark on it is likely to be tenaciously resisted. The logic of the analysis 
presented here is that the most urgent priority is not for Europe to understand its alters b tter, 
but rather itself and its own history — f  it is within Europe’s own long-sta ding struct res 
of self-definition that pluralism in general, and the Islamic presence in particular, have been 
rendered into nightmares. If so, it is Europe itself which stands in urgent need of therapy. But 
as yet the patient is still in denial, and as any psychotherapist would confirm, those who refuse 
to acknowledge the seriousness of their self-generated plight find it far easier to engage in a 
process of transference. Rather than confronting the illusory character of their own mental 
constructions, they prefer to ascribe the very behaviour which they refuse to acknowledge in 
themselves to those whom they believe are harassing them.  
 Can Europe afford to stay in denial? Half a century has passed since six million souls were 
consumed in an earlier effort to extirpat  such fantasies, but despite all the consequent guilt 
and shame Europe has managed to find itself another collective alter, about whose very 
presence some all too familiar arguments are now developing. Yet despite these disturbing 
parallels, any future confrontation may well have a far greater impact on Europe’s comfortable 
majority than did the last. Europe’s Muslims have already begun to resist denigration and 
exclusion far more actively than did their predecessors; and Europe’s Muslim population 
curently roughly similar in scale to that of pre-holocaust Jewry, their global presence is very 
much larger. If conflict should erupt across that disjunction — which God forbid! — casualties 
would not be restricted only to one side. Unwelcome and uncomfortable though the prospect 
of therapy may be — for it will necessarily entail a root and branch scrutiny of Europe’s entire 
conceptual and cultural heritage — only one diagnostic conclusion is available: if Europeans 
choose to maintain their long-sta ding condition of denial, it is at their own peril. 
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